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An Application of Hierarchicalism to Anencephalic Newborns 
 
David A. Lindholm 
Cedarville University 
 
A survey of modern medical practice reveals no shortage of ethical controversies. The root of 
these controversies is often a conflict between two or more ethical norms. According to the 
idea of hierarchicalism, such conflicts are resolved by devising a hierarchy of norms, giving 
priority of compliance to the “higher” norm and negating moral accountability for failing to 
comply with the “lower” norm. Intuitively, such an approach seems valid, as we have all 
witnessed situations in which absolute norms conflict and an agent must make a decision to 
follow the one and reject the other. The difficulty, however, comes in assessing which norm 
has priority. Therefore, a hierarchical approach to any moral question requires careful 
consideration of the relevant factors of each case and an assessment of whether “the duty 
chosen either counterbalances or overbalances the duty not chosen” (Feinberg and Feinberg, 
1993, p. 32). Based on this counterbalancing-overbalancing criterion, I will apply a 
hierarchical framework to the question of using anencephalic newborns as organ donors, and 
will show that the morally correct response is an emphatic “no.” 
 
Occurring in about one in 1000 births, anencephaly is a congenital defect characterized by the 
absence of the cerebral cortex and the presence of a rudimentary brainstem (Sullivan, 2003). 
The condition is terminal, with death usually occurring within three days of birth (Lagay, 
2004). Given their lack of actual or even potential sentience, some have argued that 
anencephalic newborns are non-persons and that they should be treated as brain dead. Singer 
and Kuhse, for example, assert that anencephalics are among those “who are humans in the 
sense of being members of the species Homo sapiens but not in the morally significant sense 
of having the distinctively human characteristics…” (1985, p. 123). Because they lack the 
requisite “indicators of humanhood,” empirical functionalists would contend that 
anencephalics should be used as organ donors before clinical death to ensure that “their short 
and tragic lives have some redeeming value” (Rae, 1993, p. 239). 
 
Indeed, in 1994, the American Medical Association’s (AMA) Council on Ethical and Judicial 
Affairs deemed it ethically acceptable to transplant a living anencephalic’s organs provided 
there was parental consent. The Council’s reasoning virtually paralleled that of the empirical 
functionalists. The decision was based on the assumptions of the newborns’ immanent death 
and complete lack of consciousness, as well as the high frequency of parental requests that 
their child’s organs be donated (Lagay, 2004). 
 
By contrast others would contend that, despite a lack of higher brain function and with the 
prospect of certain death, anencephalic newborns are nonetheless persons who should be 
treated with appropriate dignity. As Condic (2003) argues, brain death is not equivalent to the 
loss of higher brain function; rather, it is the loss of coordinated integrated function of the 
body as a whole. To be sure, anencephalic newborns possess coordinated integrated function. 
Although their brain-wave activity is abnormal, anencephalics still possess brain-wave activity 
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and are therefore still alive. According to ontological personalism, personhood is inherent in 
the human organism and is not measured by the possession of “indicators of humanhood” or 
the lack thereof. Given the fact that anencephalic newborns are alive and are therefore persons, 
it is unethical to commodify them as valuable for their parts alone (Sullivan, 2003). 
 
Although the AMA no longer condones the harvesting of organs from anencephalics prior to 
their death, the issue remains controversial and is therefore relevant to the application of 
hierarchicalism. From the perspective of graded absolutism, two conflicting ethical principles 
are at the root of the question of whether it is morally justifiable to use a living anencephalic 
newborn as an organ donor: the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence. Adherence to 
the principle of beneficence compels us to help others; adherence to nonmaleficence compels 
us not to harm others (Munson, 2000). 
 
With regard to the anencephalic question, empirical functionalism emphasizes 
beneficence, whereas ontological personalism emphasizes nonmaleficence. The desire to 
“redeem” the value of anencephalics by donating their organs to others in need 
corresponds to the “others” focus of beneficence, though it violates nonmaleficence by 
killing the anencephalic. Likewise, the desire to preserve the life of an anencephalic (i.e., 
to allow the condition to run its terminal course) follows the no-harm doctrine of 
nonmaleficence, though it does not come to the aid of other newborns in need of 
transplanted organs. 
 
Certainly, we have a prima facie duty to both principles. But here, the two are at odds, 
requiring us to give priority to one over the other. In order to prioritize these principles, let us 
consider two maxims that give insight into the duties of medical practice. The first is “Above 
all, do no harm.” The second, from the Hippocratic Oath, is “As to diseases, make a habit of 
two things – to help or at least to do no harm” (cited in Munson, 2000, pp. 32 and 34). In both 
maxims, we see the principle of nonmaleficence (“do no harm”). In the second, although we 
see the principle of beneficence (“to help”), its application is qualified by the caveat, “… or at 
least do no harm.” There is no statement, “Above all, help others.” Rather, there is a duty to 
help—but not at the cost of unnecessary harm (e.g., killing the terminally ill). Thus, the 
principle of nonmaleficence has a basic priority over beneficence. To use the criterion of 
Feinberg and Feinberg, the duty of nonmaleficence overbalances the duty of beneficence 
(1993). 
 
The priority of nonmaleficence is reflected in the AMA’s 1969 “Guidelines for Organ 
Transplantation,” which holds that there is “no justification for a relaxation of the usual 
standard of medical care” for a prospective donor (as cited in Lagay, 2004). This application of 
nonmaleficence was designed to protect the life of the donor against abuses seeking 
transplantable organs at any cost. Given Condic’s definition of brain death and the resulting 
fact that anencephalics are not dead but alive, I would extend the AMA’s 1969 guidelines to 
anencephalics. 
 
One might counter this priority of nonmaleficence over beneficence by asserting that it is 
nonmaleficence only with respect to the anencephalic, but that it is nonetheless maleficence to 
the prospective organ recipients. That is, not taking the life of one within days of death seals 
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the fate of non-anencephalic newborns that could otherwise be saved. The principle of utility, 
often used to reconcile conflicts between beneficence and nonmaleficence, would assert that 
medical practice should maximize benefit and minimize harm (Munson, 2000). And on the 
surface, the aforementioned priority of nonmaleficence with respect to the anencephalic would 
seem to violate the principle of utility. However, this counterargument fails in its rationale, for 
it assumes the “greatest good” is quantifiable in terms of the number of lives saved. It fails to 
recognize that an even greater good is upholding the intrinsic value of an individual, regardless 
of the extent of deformity. If one violates the inherent dignity of an individual to save lives, 
one cheapens the good of saving lives, much less the value of life itself. 
 
In the question of whether living anencephalic newborns should be used as organ donors, a 
consideration of the arguments of each side and an assessment of the underlying ethical 
principles within a hierarchical framework demonstrates that this can never be the morally 
right response. Living anencephalic newborns should not be sacrificed for organs in the name 
of beneficence. Rather, they should be allowed to live out the course of their lives, however 
short they may be, in the name of human dignity. 
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